KREMLINOLOGY
Russia-NATO Cross-Purposes in Afghanistan; Protests Simmer at Home

Last week Russia and NATO achieved a certain rapprochement on the basis of their cooperation on Afghanistan. At a meeting in Brussels, NATO and Russian military officials squared off for the first time since the 2008 Russia-Georgia war.

NATO’s interest in drawing Russia into the Afghanistan problem is crystal clear: its own strength and resources are insufficient to stabilize the situation in the country. As for Russia, its serious economic interest to join the Afghan process is manifest. The point is that with the help of NATO’s money Moscow could relaunch some 142 Afghan industrial and infrastructure facilities built back in the Soviet age. For this purpose, Russia intends to demand the most favorable terms–i.e. bypassing any bidding process to lock up the contracts with 100-percent foreign backing.

However, NATO appears unenthusiastic about meeting Moscow’s demands. Most of the Alliance members have neither the drive to surge their contingents, nor the desire to step up funding. For example, NATO has little interest in paying for the Russian helicopters slated for action in Afghanistan, which Moscow is prepared to deliver on commercial terms only.

There are also differences between Moscow and Brussels over measures to combat drug trafficking, the role of the Moscow-controlled Collective Security Treaty Organization in Afghanistan and military shipments to Afghanistan through Russian territory.

What all this signifies is that despite a certain commonality of interest in Afghanistan, it does not look as if Russian and NATO are pursuing the same goals in the Afghan settlement process. Clearly, this is bound to stall cooperation between the two sides and have negative effects on the pace and scope of the progress toward peace and stability in Afghanistan.

Implications of Opposition Protests

The past weekend saw a flurry of protests in various provinces against government policies, which could not but alarm the Russian authorities. These rallies were varied in character, but a common thread to them all was the populace’s growing frustration with the situation in the country.

The rally in Kalinigrad, Russia’s westernmost province was the largest in over 20 years (over 10,000 people) and had been intended as a demonstration over the government’s plans to raise the local transportation tax. However, it spontaneously acquired a political edge. Protesters demanded the resignations of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and their provincial governor Georgy Boos while calling for a return to gubernatorial elections.

A rally in Moscow’s center was initially engineered as a political action. Traditionally, on the 31th of every month the opposition stages protest rallies in defense of Article 31 of Russia’s Constitution which guarantees freedom of assembly. The Moscow authorities had not sanctioned the rally under an artificial pretext. Nevertheless, it did take place. Over 500 people attended, including such prominent opposition leaders as Boris Nemtsov, Ludmilla Alexeyeva, and Lev Ponomaryov. Similar actions were held in other Moscow districts and Russian cities.

Despite the Moscow government’s assurances, the police—like on previous occasions—roughly broke up the protests: Over 100 protesters were retained and taken to police stations.

Tellingly, anti-Putin slogans prevailed at the aforesaid opposition rallies—both in Moscow and Kaliningrad—whereas President Medvedev’s performance was not challenged. This suggests that the opposition deems Putin and his entourage their chief adversary and is pinning some hopes on a more liberal, according to their lights, Medvedev. However, these hopes have yet to materialize.

Dr. Yevgeny Volk is Coordinator of The Heritage Foundation's Moscow Office.